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Eliciting Individual-Specific Discount Rates
Longstanding debate over the appropriate social discount rate for public projects stems from our
lack of knowledge about how individual discount rates vary across people and across choice con-
texts. Using a sample of roughly 15,000 choices by over 2000 individuals, we estimate utility-
theoretic models concerning private tradeoffs involving money over time that reveal individual-
specific discount rates. We control for experimentally differentiated choice scenarios, sociodemo-
graphic heterogeneity, and elicitation formats, and complex forms of heteroscedasticity. Statisti-
cally significant heterogeneity in discount rates is quantified for both an exponential discounting
model and a competing hyperbolic model, but neither specification clearly dominates. (D91, H4,
C25, C35)
Whenever the benefits and costs of a non-tradable durable good or a public good have different time
profiles, discounting is a necessary step in any assessment of that good’s desirability. A pervasive feature of
the existing social choice literature is the notion that we need one common discount rate for social decision-
making. One single discount rate is a convenient assumption for many models. If capital markets were
perfect, of course, then the market interest rate would accurately reflect everyone’s intertemporal preferences.
However, factors such as transactions costs and people’s tendencies to define artificially separate budgets
for different activities invalidate the assumption of perfect capital markets. This foils any expectation that
individuals will adjust levels of present and future consumption to bring marginal rates of substitution into
line with a single market interest rate.
Both Robert C. Lind (1990) and Kenneth J. Arrow et al.(1996) argue that discount rates should be based
on how individuals trade off between present and future consumption, and that these rates are indeed likely
to differ contextually. At the individual level, at least for non-tradeable goods, the discount rate is an artifact
of preferences over current versus future consumption, just as willingness to pay for different commodities is
an artifact of preferences over the contemporaneous consumption of different goods. There is no reason why
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marginal rates of time preference should be any less individual, or less context-specific, than marginal rates
of substitution between any pair of contemporaneous goods.2 The quest for a single representative discount
rate to use in making social choices stems from the problem that heterogeneity in the relevant individual
discount rates is largely unquantified.
For individual i, where i = 1, ..., N , let bit represent net benefits in periods t = 1, ..., T and let
(bi1, bi2, ...biT ) be the time profile of net benefits.3 In the absence of information about individual-specific
time-preferences, the present discounted value of aggregate net benefits of a particular durable or public
good in each future period,
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In this case, the first step is to discount individual net benefits back to the present using a discount factor
appropriate for that individual, (1 + ri)−t. The second step is to aggregate these individual discounted net
benefits into a measure of social benefits. The practical problem for implementing this alternative measure
is that we typically do not know much about the values of ri, for an individual with particular attributes,
that might apply in a particular choice context.
In this paper, we propose and demonstrate a strategy for the measurement of individual-specific discount
rates via survey methods. We first lay out a formal random utility framework to accommodate the conceptual
problem of consumer choice when the individual faces a time profile of costs in order to obtain some time
2The individual discount rate is equal to the marginal rate of time preference, minus one. The "pure" rate of time preference
differs from the individual discount rate in that it is evaluated along the individual’s intertemporal budget constraint at a point
corresponding to equal amounts of current and future consumption (Emily C. Lawrance, 1991).
3We will not discriminate between benefits in terms of consumption and benefits in terms of utility.
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profile of services of a durable or public good, as well as a second choice concerning the receipt of money with
different time profiles. This general model involves two types of choices because we envision that this approach
will have value in producing clean estimates of fitted individual discount rates that can be used simultaneously
to explain variation in other individual decisions in a multi-equation system. For identification, as in any
simultaneous equations model, it will be important to include exogenous determinants of individual discount
rates that do not also explain the durable or public goods choice.
We then focus empirically on just the individual discount rate portion of the model. We query survey
respondents concerning their preferred way to receive some lottery winnings–either as a stream of annual
payments over some time horizon, or as a smaller lump sum in the current period. With these choice data, we
can generate empirical estimates of exponential and simple hyperbolic discount functions and also describe
the results of attempting to fit a more general hyperbolic form. Our models accommodate broad heterogeneity
in preferences and complex forms of heteroscedasticity in the underlying indirect utility specification. We
also assess the sensitivity of estimated discount rates and error variances to a number of alternative choice
scenarios and elicitation formats.
The main idea we wish to promulgate, by framing our model in this way, is that human behavior with
respect to related choices should be consistent. One utility function should underlie all of the choices made by
any single individual. Any random utility model we use to take advantage of choices that highlight subjects’
individual discount rates should also be able to accommodate these same individuals’ choices with respect
to durable goods or public goods. The random utility models used to capture each type of choice will have
common preference parameters, so the different types of choices can be pooled and estimated jointly. The
specific discount rate choice and the additional durable or public goods choice can be combined in one model
to improve our chances of identifying a wider range of preference parameters. A discount rate is an attribute
of individual preferences that is not usually separately identifiable within the context of a single durable or
public goods choice unless some strong assumptions are made. However, if durable or public goods choice
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data can be combined with other choices by the same individuals that expressly and exclusively involve
tradeoffs of money over time, within a fully compatible utility specification, then there is some hope for
separately identifying heterogeneity in discount rates and heterogeneity in preferences for durable or public
goods.
I. Background
A. Contextual Differences in Empirical Discount Rates
Over the last twenty years or so, both economists and psychologists have explored factors that can affect
individual discount rates. Shane Frederick et al. (2002) provide a thorough survey of theoretical and empirical
research concerning time discounting and time preference. They tabulate over forty attempts at empirical
estimation of discount rates according to type (experimental or field), good(s) (money, life-years, etc.), real
or hypothetical, elicitation method (choice, matching, rating, or pricing), time range (from less than one
day, to 57 years), and finally according to the range of implied discount rates and the associated discount
factors. What is striking about this summary is the extraordinary variance across studies in empirically
estimated private discount rates across different choice contexts, even without considering possible systematic
differences across sociodemographic groups. This accumulating evidence strengthens the case for departing
from the convention of using one representative discount rate in decision-making. Where there are substantial
groupwise differences in discount rates, it may be very important to preserve these differences in net benefits
estimation. It is also possible that differences in discount rates across contexts (long- or short-term tradeoffs,
private or public tradeoffs) will be sufficiently large that just one menu of group-specific discount rates will
be insufficient. All of this points to a need for new techniques to elicit reliable group- and context-specific
discount rates.
B. Discounted Utility Anomalies and Hyperbolic Discounting
Frederick et al. (2002) identify economists’ reliance on the expedient single-parameter discounted utility
(DU) model suggested by Paul A. Samuelson (1937) as one of the impediments to progress in discount rate
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research. They inventory the suite of DU-anomalous results that have induced a number of researchers
to think about other representations of discounting behavior. Many researchers have now explored these
anomalies (e.g. George F. Loewenstein and Richard H. Thaler (1989), Loewenstein and Jon Elster (1992),
and Loewenstein and Drazen Prelec (1992)). Frederick et al. (2002) emphasize that individual intertemporal
tradeoffs can reflect a whole host of different processes that play out at the individual level, not just "pure time
preference." Among possible confounding factors, they enumerate consumption reallocation, intertemporal
arbitrage, concave utility, uncertainty, inflation considerations, expectations of changing utility, and the
collection of tendencies labeled as habit formation, anticipatory utility, and visceral influences.
Among alternative discounting formulas, a generalized hyperbolic discount function is discussed by
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992):
φg(t) = (1 + γt)
−β/γ , β, γ > 0 (3)
where the γ parameter dictates how far the function departs from constant (exponential) discounting. The
φg(t) form appears to have been defined by Charles M. Harvey (1986), and derived axiomatically by Prelec
(1989). In the limit, as γ goes to zero, the generalized hyperbolic function becomes the standard exponential
discounting function,
φe(t) = exp(−βt) (4)
Generalized hyperbolic functional forms seem to have had their genesis with a one-parameter special
case, φm(t) = (1 + γt)
−1, proposed by Richard J. Herrnstein (1981) and explored further by James Mazur
(1987). The φm(t) form involves the constraint β = γ. Harvey (1986) suggested an alternative case,
φh(t) = (1 + t)
−β (5)
embodying the constraint that γ = 1.
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C. Weitzman’s Expert Survey Sample
In a recent paper in this Review, Martin L. Weitzman (2001) arrives at a functional form for discount
rates identical to that in equation (3), but via a different route.4 From a survey of the opinions of over 2,000
professional Ph.D.-level economists, he determines that the social discount rates advocated by these experts
range from −3 percent to +27 percent, with a sample mean of about 4 percent and a standard deviation
of about 3 percent. He notes that the empirical marginal distribution appears to compares favorably, in
terms of its shape, to a gamma probability density function. The key empirical insight is that individual
expert opinions about discount rates vary rather substantially. Still, Weitzman’s goal is to develop a model
to produce a single social discount rate for policy evaluation that nevertheless accommodates heterogeneous
opinions of experts concerning the intertemporal tradeoffs we should be willing to make.5
Weitzman acknowledges that “. . . the average panel member knows about, and typically does not feel
acutely uncomfortable with, the approximation of constant exponential discounting. The primary disagree-
ment among panel members is over the appropriate value of the as-if-constant discount rate.” (p. 264).
Weitzman notes that the amount of "uncertainty" about discount rates in the sample generates a sliding-
scale effective discount-rate schedule, whose decline over time is significant enough to recommend that it be
incorporated into discounting of long-term projects.6 We believe that this "uncertainty" might be better
described as "heterogeneity." Had Weitzman collected the characteristics of each of these economists, he
might have fit a regression-type model to explain the differences in their subjective social discount rates.
However, he only differentiates between 50 "leading" economists and the rest of us who answered his survey.
His point estimate for the mean preferred social discount rate in the "leading" sample differs from that for
the other group, being slightly larger, but he undertakes no formal hypothesis testing, nor does he seek to
4Weitzman does not, himself, identify the similarity between his specification and that of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992).
5For details concerning the relationship between Weitzman’s approach and the Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) model, see
Appendix I.
6Richard G. Newell and William A.Pizer (2000) delve further into the consequences of uncertain discount rates. When the
expectation is taken with respect to a density function for "the" discount rate, the expected discounted value of future benefits
will be greater than the discounted value computed using the expected discount rate, since discounted values are a convex
function of the discount rate.
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use any more than just this implicit dummy variable to look for systematic differences in discount rates.
D. Empirical Estimation of Individual Discount Rates
A seminal paper by Jerry Hausman (1979) uses observed household choices among consumer durables
(air conditioners) with higher and lower capital and operating costs to infer discount rates. In one model,
these rates are allowed to vary with income levels.7
An experimental setting with numerous "matching"-type questions per subject is used by Kris N. Kirby
and Nino N. Marakovíc (1995). This strategy allows estimation of individual-specific φe(t) and φh(t) discount
functions, but does not extend to explaining heterogeneity in terms of any observable individual characteris-
tics. John A. Cairns and Marjon M. van der Pol (1997) also ask matching questions (of roughly 500 survey
subjects) concerning both “short run” and “long run” choices. They find evidence favoring the non-constant
discounting models over the conventional constant discounting model.8 The possibility of casting discount
rates as systematic varying parameters is noted, but they indicate that their data were not collected to make
these distinctions.
Survey "choice"-type questions (the family of methods employed in the present study) appear to have
been first used to infer marginal rates of time preference by Magnus Johannesson and Per-Olov Johansson
(1997), albeit in a health context, and they do not explore how this rate itself varies with sociodemographics.
Intertemporal preferences for health are also elicited via survey in van der Pol and Cairns (2001). Implied dis-
count rates for two samples of about 400 respondents vary according to whether own health or others’ health
is being considered, but these discount rates are not systematically differentiated by sociodemographics.
In another vein, Harrell W. Chesson and W. Kip Viscusi (2000) address discounting jointly with un-
certainty, estimating implicit rates of time preference with respect to deferred gambles. They find that
estimated discount rates decrease with the time horizon of the gamble, a result that is consistent with the
7Dermot Gately (1980) uses a similar approach with refrigerators and finds even higher implied discount rates (although he
does not report any systematic heterogeneity in discount rates).
8They base their assessments on the sums of squared deviations between the actual empirical discount factors conveyed by
respondents, and the fitted discount factors implied by each model, where these factors are determined by line-searches.
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predictions of Loewenstein and Elster (1992) concerning time horizon effects. However, they acknowledge
that “the combined tasks of discounting and probability assessment exceed the cognitive capabilities of many
survey subjects.”
The only extant large-sample empirical estimates of discount rates in a revealed preference context are
offered by John T. Warner and Saul Pleeter (2001, in this Review). In an ambitious study, they analyze the
decisions of many thousands of US military personnel concerning a choice between a lump-sum separation
benefit or an annuity, relying on a reduced-form model for the latent individual discount rate based on
the discrete choices of individual subjects between their two payment alternatives.9 Statistically significant
heterogeneity in the implicit exponential discount rates is confirmed, but there is little formal attention paid
in the paper to the distinction between exponential and hyperbolic discounting models. The huge cross-
sectional samples also raise the usual questions about heteroscedasticity, but its presence in the model is
not assessed.10 In the present paper, we consider alternative discounting models and we explicitly model
the variances of the errors, which are related to choice consistency across subgroups. (See Joffre Swait and
Jordan Louviere, 1993; J.R. DeShazo and German Fermo, 2002).
Two very recent examples should also be mentioned: L. Robin Keller and Elisabetta Strazzera (2002)
estimate both φe(t) and φh(t), but use an existing data set from Thaler (1981) to generate simulated data
for their analyses. They mention the possibility of, but do not pursue, systematically varying individual
discount rates. Survey data concerning choices among alternative climate change mitigation programs in the
context of forest loss prevention are used by David F. Layton and Richard A. Levine (2002). In conjunction
with Weitzman’s social discount rate distribution for professional economists, they calculate posterior and
9Such models have actually be in wide use for many years in the environmental non-market valuation literature, since they
are suitable for the analysis of referendum contingent valuation data. These models admit for structural choice modeling, but
these authors do not pursue a formal random utility framework for their analysis.
10Warner and Pleeter are careful to control for self-selection into their observed sample from the overall population of
military personnel (not all of whom were eligible for the payment choice). But they still cannot compensate for non-random
selection into the military in the first place, which may render these samples very different from the general population in
terms of unobservables. We still have no real idea whether the estimated discount rates for their two samples are any more
representative of rates in the general population (of similar ages and education levels) than are discount rates estimated from
other special samples of respondents.
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prior odds in favor of several discount rate intervals. This approach accommodates heterogeneity in discount
rates but does not parameterize the relationship between the sizes of discount rates and other individual
characteristics.
II. Formal Random Utility Choice Framework
Our formal model is intended to accommodate two choices by individuals. One is a choice concerning
a non-tradable durable good or a long-lived public good. The second choice (upon which we will focus in
this paper) is a stylized choice concerning whether the individual would prefer to take lottery winnings as
(a.) a series of annual payments, or (b.) a smaller lump sum now. In the most general specifications of
the random utility model presumed to underlie both types of choices, we will assume that current utility vi
depends linearly upon current net income, yi (as a proxy for the consumption of all other goods), and the
current flow of services from the durable or public good, gi. In the case of homogeneous preferences, current
utility can be expressed as:
vi = µyi + δgi + ui (6)
where ui is an error term. Of course, a linear specification for utility allows one to ignore the usual problem
of departures between the discounting of utility and the discounting of consumption.
Current utility, however, is not the sole determinant of choices in cases where the individual faces different
time profiles for future costs and future benefits. Taking advantage of the linearity in our specification, assume
that the stream of future benefits from the flow of services of the durable or public good can be converted
into a present discounted value Gi. For the money-denominated argument of utility, the durable good choice
also implies a change in the present discounted value of future net income, Yi, through both the one-time
initial capital cost, Ci, and a time profile of operating costs over future periods, which in the simplest case
could be assumed to be a constant per-period cost of ci.
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In this exposition, we will use just a binary choice concerning whether to purchase one specific model of
a durable good, or, analogously, to vote in favor of the provision of a particular long-lived public good.11 In
binary choice models, the difference in utility levels across the two alternatives in the stated choice scenario,
∆Vi, is presumed to drive the individual’s choice. In our linear model, this difference in discounted utilities
will depend upon the difference in discounted net income levels, ∆Yi, and the difference in discounted net
durable- or public-good benefits, ∆Gi. For completeness, the discounted error term would also need to be
distinguished: u∗i .
For conventional exponential discounting with individual discount rate ri, in discrete time, the exponential
discount factor is φe(t) = (1 + ri)
−t. If earned income in all relevant future periods up to Ti would be the












+ δi∆Gi + εi (7)
where εi is the difference in the u∗i error terms associated with discounted utility levels under the two
alternatives.12 As usual, the scale of the error term and the parameters cannot be separately identified and
must be normalized to unity for some subgroup.
When such a durable- or public-goods choice is used alone, it is often difficult to separately identify all
three of the parameters µi, δi and ri. However, we can use the same basic utility difference function to
capture a second choice, concerning how to take lottery winnings, which involves no difference in the net
present value of the services of a durable goods. Here, Li is the optional current-period lump sum lottery
disbursement, to be compared against a sequence of Ti annual payments in the amount pi, starting today.
11 It would be straightforward to generalize our model to accommodate not just the choice of whether to buy a durable good,
but also a choice between several durable goods. This could lead to a multinomial logit choice model for the durable good
decision.
12The properties of the underlying current-period errors, ui, may be assumed to be such that the transformed and differenced












+ δi[0] + εi (8)
From this type of choice used alone, it is not possible to identify both µi and δi, but greater resolution can
be obtained for ri. The key insight is that pooling the types of choices in equations (7) and (8) may allow
all parameters to be readily identified. If the same discount rate applies to both increases and decreases in
future net income, the durable/public goods choice can serve to identify the marginal rates of substitution
between money and the services of the durable/public good, whereas the lottery winnings choice can more
specifically identify the individual discount rate.
Concentrating on just the lottery winnings portion of the joint choice model, simple hyperbolic discounting











+ δi[0] + εi (9)
where βi is the hyperbolic discounting parameter. For generalized hyperbolic discounting, ∆Vi for the lottery










+ δi[0] + εi (10)
The full specifications described above are appropriate models to handle the joint estimation of (a) a
policy choice when the individual faces different costs at different times in order to obtain a change in the
present value of a flow of services from public goods ∆Gi, and (b) an auxiliary financial time-wise tradeoff
such as our lottery winnings choice. Our empirical illustration, however, focuses on just the subsidiary
problem of identifying individual-specific discount rates (either ri or βi, and possibly γ), so some of the
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generality of the theoretical specification is foreclosed.13
In our estimating data, the only thing that differs across the alternatives posed in the stated preference
choice scenario about lottery winnings is the present discounted value of net income, so ∆Gi = 0 for all
choices. There is no information upon which to estimate δi, the marginal indirect utility from the public
good. As a result, µi, the marginal indirect utility of net discounted income cannot be identified either,
since it merely affects the scale of net utility, which is irrelevant to choices. The “difference” upon which the
choice is based can be conceived as merely a difference in net discounted income, rather than a difference in
utilities. Our estimating specifications therefore constrain µi = 1 , and the simplified versions of our random
utility models for the lottery winnings choice become:







Simple hyperbolic: ∆Vi ∝ Li − pi
Ti−1X
t=0
(1 + t)−βi + ε
0
i (12)
Generalized hyperbolic: ∆Vi ∝ Li − pi
Ti−1X
t=0
(1 + γt)−(βi/γ) + ε
0
i (13)
These measures of the indirect utility differences, ∆Vi, are the building blocks for our random utility
econometric models. Appendix II describes in detail the construction of an appropriate log-likelihood func-
tion for our data. The function is a sum of component ordered-logit log-likelihoods for choices with two,
13 In principle, it is possible to allow the underlying indirect utility function to be non-linear with respect to net income. If
the magnitudes of these costs are sufficiently large to represent a substantial portion of the individual’s income, it should be
possible to separately identify individual-specific degrees of risk aversion (nonlinearity in income in the indirect utility function)
as distinct from individual-specific discount rates. For our data, there appears to be insufficient variability in net incomes to
permit a distinction between discounting and risk aversion if risk aversion in preferences is permitted. Also, since the stream
of future payments and the current period lump sum that define our specific choice scenario are represented as being certain,
it is not too surprising that there is insufficient information in the answers to the lottery choice question to accurately identify
the individual’s degree of risk aversion. Chesson and Viscusi (2000) also have difficulty introducing risk aversion as a property
of preferences that is distinct from discounting. Their hypothetical choice scenarios compound uncertainty and discounting,
however, and they end up estimating implicit discount rates with the acknowledgement that failing to allow for risk aversion
will bias these estimates downward.
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three, four, and five possible responses pooled over independent samples. We impose non-negativity for
the estimated discount rates by specifying them as ri = exp(r0Zri ) and βi = exp(β
0Zβi ). The vectors of
explanatory variables, Zri and Z
β
i , need not be identical, but we will drop their superscripts.
There is also the matter of heteroscedasticity. In any stated preference context, there is always a concern
that the quality of the choice information elicited in a hypothetical choice scenario is dependent upon how
seriously the respondent takes the choice exercise, upon their prior experience in similar choice situations,
and on any constraints that prevent them from considering their choices sufficiently carefully. These factors
can be labeled as "inclination," "ability," and "opportunity." It is typically important to acknowledge the
existence of different subgroups of respondents who may exhibit systematically greater or lesser dispersion
in the error term in the underlying random utility choice model. Utility-difference error variances have been
argued to affect "choice consistency" (DeShazo and Fermo, 2002).
III. Survey Sample
Our data are derived from an Web-based (internet) survey with over 2000 participants from a wide variety
of classes at universities throughout the US and Canada. It can be viewed as a national and international
extension of the typical “classroom survey,” but there is no pretense that the sample for this study represents
the US and Canadian populations, or even the population of college students in these countries. There are
significant disparities across institutions in access to web-based resources, across classes in the salience of the
larger survey topic (global climate policy), and in the opportunity costs of students’ time spent in completing
the survey.14 The module of the survey that was designed specifically to elicit individual discount rates
asks the respondent to imagine they have just won a lottery. They are asked to choose between taking their
winnings as a series of T annual installments, starting "today," or as a smaller overall lump sum payable
14For social choice problems involving very long time horizons, it can be argued that the preferences of today’s young people
deserve particular attention, since they will be the surviving (net) beneficiaries of whatever policies are adopted in the near
term. And while survey research is inevitably vulnerable to criticism based upon its hypotheticality, we at least pursue the issue
of "construct validity" very aggressively in this paper. It is crucial, for example, to assess whether there is systematic variation
in the error terms in one’s model and to determine whether the nature of this variation (which cannot be avoided) is plausible.
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immediately. Table 1 outlines our available variables and provides descriptive statistics for our sample.
Across respondents, the dynamically loaded survey page randomly varies the size of the annual install-
ments among $300, $600, $1200, $2400, $3600, and $4800, and the number of these installments (the time
horizon) among 20, 30, and 40 years. The sizes of the annual installments were intended to reflect increased
monthly costs of $25, $50, $100, $300, and $400 for a public good, and the time horizon captures some
of the more-expensive and longer-term environmental programs, such as climate change mitigation. Each
respondent is presented with an ordered list of lump sums and asked to indicate whether (and sometimes,
to what extent) they would prefer each lump sum to the single pattern of annual installments.
A selection of sociodemographic characteristics was elicited after the various choices in the survey had been
recorded, including age brackets, gender, educational attainment, field of study, whether courses have been
taken in economics, work status, subjective conservatism, and family income bracket. Some less conventional
variables were also collected. To proxy for individual capital market constraints, we ask for an estimate of
the largest sum of money the individual believes they could qualify to borrow, without collateral. The survey
software also keeps track of timing as respondents progress through the survey.15
Finally, preference elicitation formats were randomized across respondents. Some saw a long list of
thirteen lump sums, some saw seven, five, or only three, although the range in lump sums was identical
across these four different designs. The objective exponential discount rates implicit in the list of lump
sums presented to respondents who saw all thirteen lump sums were integer values between 1 percent and
10 percent, as well as 12 percent, 15 percent and 20 percent.16 Across respondents, lump sums were either
increasing or decreasing in size from the top to the bottom in the list. Finally, the format of the actual choice
with respect to each lump sum involved different numbers of response options (just two, for "Yes/No", up
to five levels including "Definitely Yes", "Probably Yes", "Not Sure", "Probably No", and "Definitely No").
15The online survey was programmed by the authors.
16Early versions of the survey included 30 percent and 50 percent implicit rates, but the very small corresponding lump sums
were overwhelmingly rejected. Since their presence in the menu of possibilities added little information, these lump sums were
dropped in later editions of the survey.
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The horizontal ordering (Yes to No, No to Yes) of these answer options was also randomized. By using an
assortment of elicitation formats, we can assess the impact of any one format selection on the discount rates
that we infer from respondents’ choices. In this paper, empirical results concerning elicitation formats will
be treated as tangential to the main question and will be described in the appendices.
IV. Empirical Results
There are three types of variables in play: those that describe the randomly assigned context of the choice
from which individual discount rates are inferred, those that measure individual-specific characteristics, and
those that describe the particular variant of the randomized design of the elicitation format.
A. Heteroscedastic Exponential and Hyperbolic Parameter Estimates
Table 2 details the parameter point estimates and asymptotic t-test statistics17 for heteroscedastic vari-
ants of the two special cases of the generalized hyperbolic discounting model: conventional exponential
discounting, φe(t), and simple hyperbolic discounting, φh(t), in the sense of Harvey (1986).
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The maximized values of the log-likelihood functions for these two models are negligibly different. With
only one real exception, the variables that account for contextual and individual heterogeneity bear coef-
ficients of the same sign that are statistically significant at approximately the same levels across the two
specifications. Thus it is possible to review most of these results generically.
The choice scenarios presented to individuals were randomized in terms of the size of the annual payments
that were being proposed, and the number of future years over which these payments were being offered, so
17The final column of Table 2 displays the R2 values for auxiliary regressions where each regressor in the group is employed
successively as the dependent variable in a model that uses the others in that particular index as explanatory variables (a good
indicator for multicollinearity). These statistics are provided only for those variables that were not randomized
18Estimation was accomplished using Matlab 6.1.0.450, Release 12.1. Since respondents were asked to react to multiple
different lump sums, there are 3595 choices corresponding to 2-level answers, 3749 corresponding to 3-level answers, 3499
corresponding to 4-level answers, and 4065 corresponding to 5-level answers. We will not, in this paper, pursue the panel
aspects of the data set. The sets of lump sum payment alternatives presented to each individual are assigned randomly across
individuals and the offered amounts are entirely exogenous. Any unobserved heterogeneity bias has been minimized by the
degree of randomization that is present in the model. Given the nonlinearity of the model, however, there may be some gains
from panel methods stemming from the monotonic ordering of the lump sums, despite the randomized assignment of their sizes
and the direction of this ordering.
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there can be no correlations among them or with other variables. In our sample, the larger the amount of
money that is at stake, the higher is the apparent discount rate for the individual. These results contrast
with the experimental results discussed by Thaler (1981), Uri Benzion et al. (1989) and Loewenstein and
Thaler (1989). The existing literature suggests that people may be more willing to wait a year for “$150
then versus $100 now” than they are to wait a year for “$15 then versus $10 now.” Hersh Shefrin and Thaler
(1988) suggest that large future amounts may be viewed merely as foregone savings interest, whereas smaller
amounts may be viewed as foregone consumption, which may be more highly valued.
Our results concerning the time horizon constitute the only appreciable difference between the exponen-
tial discounting model and the simple hyperbolic discounting specification. In the exponential discounting
specification, the longer the time horizon over which the lottery winnings are to be paid, the lower is the
apparent discount rate (controlling for age). This result is consistent with the anomalies observed elsewhere
in the discounting literature. In the hyperbolic discounting specification, however, a longer time horizon
leads to a statistically significantly larger implied discount rate. Neither model, therefore, produces discount
rates which are independent of the time horizon in question.
Warner and Pleeter (2001) find that individual discount rates decline with age and education and they
report similar findings by Harry J. Gilman (1976) and Matthew Black (1984) in earlier military studies.
In our sample, discount rates appear to be larger for individuals in this sample who are older (controlling
for educational attainment). Older students tend to be present in the sample because they did not pursue
college education at the same time as their peers. A higher discount rate may have led them to forego college
when they were younger because the greater future earnings were more heavily discounted.19 Age is also
negatively correlated, although not perfectly, with remaining life expectancy, which is not a factor included
in our tabulated results. The rate at which the logarithm of fitted individual discount rates increases with
age (or, becomes lower with greater with life expectancy) is greater for males than for females. At 18.9 years
19Of course, it is not possible in a cross-sectional sample to determine whether this is an age effect or a cohort effect or some
combination of the two.
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of age, females tend to have discount rates that are roughly equal to those of similar males, but beyond
that age, discount rates for females rise more slowly with age than those of males. (Warner and Pleeter
identify statistically significant gender effects only in their sample of enlisted personnel, where males display
higher discount rates.) Our estimated age effects also conflict with the speculation of Chesson and Viscusi
(2000) that the young may be inclined to discount the future more heavily, leading to “temporal myopia”
with respect to longer-term prospects.20 However, we do find that the greater the individual’s educational
attainment, the lower their discount rate, which suggests that more highly educated individuals are more
willing to postpone income, which is intuitively plausible. Students with greater educational attainment will
have self-selected to be in college longer, foregoing current earnings, which may imply that they have lower
discount rates.
Curiously, discount rates in our study are larger for individuals with higher family incomes, suggesting
that "impatience" is greater when the subject stems from a higher-income background. This contrasts with
the reported findings of Gilman and Black, and the findings of Hausman (1979), where the discount rate
decreases with increased income. Hausman posits that discount rates should vary with income class “owing
to the progression of the income tax which causes intertemporal marginal rates of substitution to differ.”
He argues that the discount rate should decrease as income rises, even with perfect capital markets, since
the marginal tax rate rises with income while the services of many consumer durables are untaxed. Higher
discount rates for the poor are attributed to “uncertainty of their income streams and their lack of savings.”
In our data, however, higher family income may be correlated with many other omitted variables.Wealth,
for example, is not measured in our study.
Similarly perplexing results emerge for our capital access variable. The “capital access” question in our
survey was worded as follows: “The largest amount of money that I believe I could currently qualify to
20We did make some effort to distinguish life expectancy from age. Our survey elicits life expectancy as a separate implicit
variable by questioning respondents about whether they expected to be alive at each of each of a number of decadal intervals
in the future. Crude proxies to control for life expectancy did not make any significant improvement to our models, nor did
they lead to any appreciable change in the apparent effects of age on discount rates. In such a predominantly young sample,
mortality risks of any kind may not yet be registering.
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borrow from a bank, credit union, trust company or family member (without collateral) is:” The options,
and percents of the sample selecting each option, were $0 (5 percent), $100 (4 percent), $100 (31 percent),
$10,000 (44 percent), $50,000 (10 percent), $100,000 (2 percent), more than $100,000 (4 percent).21 From a
population of mostly college students, where 40 percent of the sample reports a level of family income lower
than $50,000, there is some question as to whether every respondent fully understood the idea of “without
collateral.” It is conceivable that family sources for particularly affluent students could provide capital access
at the level indicated by some of them. Although the simple correlation between the family income brackets
and the capital access variable was only 0.18, more than half of the respondents who indicated the highest
category for capital access also indicate the highest category for family income.
In Hausman’s revealed preference context, individual discount rates are derived from consumer’s choices
about spending money, whereas here, they are derived from individuals’ choices about how to receive money.
In the present case, capital market constraints that might be binding on purchase decisions may have much
less of an effect on choices about the time pattern of receipt of money. If, compared to other people, a
respondent was aware that they could borrow money at a lower effective interest rate, they should be less
inclined to take the immediate lump sum and more inclined to favor the program of deferred payments,
implying a smaller discount rate. Such logic does not seem to apply here. A larger discount rate might be
associated with a greater perceived “need” for money in the present, or greater "impatience" about receiving
money. One is left to speculate upon the distribution of desires for immediate gratification, or variations in
the sense of entitlement, across college students from different socioeconomic backgrounds.
The nature of the individual’s education also has some systematic effects on discount rates. In Warner and
Pleeter’s military sample, personnel in the Engineering and Scientist or Professional categories display lower
discount rates than others, as did enlisted personnel in the top two "mental groups" with the highest test
scores. Higher test scores are argued to reflect better capacity to understand the implications of intertemporal
21The open-ended category was arbitrarily coded as $150,000 to produce a continuous variable to proxy for the individual’s
subjective access to capital markets.
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choices. In our study, we distinguish those individuals who major in social science disciplines (which will
include economics) and those who major in business. A separate dummy variable is included for those who
have taken at least one course in economics (since one would hope that this status would convey a greater
degree of financial savvy). This last variable distinguishes between non-economics social science majors and
those with some exposure to economic thinking, as well as capturing economics courses taken as an elective
by students from other disciplines. Business majors and those with economics training have statistically
significantly lower discount rates, and non-economist social science majors have higher discount rates.
Being further to the right on a simple liberal-conservative spectrum may have a positive effect on discount
rates in the exponential model, but the evidence is relatively weak. No significant effect is evident in the
hyperbolic model. Whether the individual is part-time or full-time employed has no statistically significant
bearing on discount rates.
See Appendix III for discussion of the various incidental parameters associated with these models (i.e.
those concerning the characteristics of the elicitation format, heteroscedasticity, and the incidental ordered
logit threshold parameters).
B. More-General Models
The maximized log-likelihood values for the simple exponential and hyperbolic discount rate models are
extremely close.22 Thus, it may not be surprising that a generalized specification proves difficult to estimate.
In principle, it is possible to generalize the γ parameter to a systematically varying parameter. However,
such a generalization proves difficult in this application.23
It is often problematic to estimate parameters that appear in ratio to each other, so we report upon a
reparameterization of the generalized hyperbolic model adapted from the usual strategy used in estimation
22For the entire set of 40 analogous estimated parameters in these two models, the correlation between the point estimates
is 0.9963. A simple regressions of the 40 hyperbolic model point estimates on the corresponding exponential estimates implies
proportionality. This regression has an intercept no different from zero and a slope of 0.74 (with t-ratio in excess of 71). Limiting
the regression to just the 22 discount rate slope coefficients, the hyperbolic coefficients average 0.84 times the exponential
coefficients (t-ratio = 206).
23A Lagrange multiplier (LM) test, evaluated at the restricted specification that is the simple hyperbolic model, might prove
useful in other cases where there appear to be greater distinctions between the exponential and the simple hyperbolic models.
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of Tobit models. Instead of estimating γ and a systematically varying version of βi, we can instead define
β∗iZi = βiZi/γ and γ∗ = 1/γ. The alternative version of the generalized hyperbolic discounting model, in
our simplified form, then becomes:





iZi + εi (14)
It is most convenient to approach the generalization by starting from the hyperbolic specification, since
the generalization amounts to freeing up the restriction that γ = 1. But even with reparameterization, it is
not possible to attain convergence for the general specification with regressors with these data.24
Thus, as do Cairns and Van der Pol (1997), we find it very difficult to discriminate between the simple
exponential and simple hyperbolic discounting functions by using the generalized hyperbolic model that has
each of these as special cases.
C. Heterogeneity in Fitted Individual Discount Rates
Frederick et al. (2002) review estimates of individual discount rates in the literature that range from
zero to infinity. What do our models imply about the distributions of fitted empirical discount rates,
both exponential and hyperbolic, for this sample? We estimate ri = exp(r0Zi) and βi = exp(β
0Zi) by
maximum likelihood methods, so each of the discount rate "indexes," r0Zi and β0Zi, can be assumed to be
asymptotically normally distributed. The process of exponentiation takes the symmetric normal distribution
and converts it into a skewed lognormal distribution. To produce expected values for each individual fitted
discount rate, therefore, it is first necessary to calculate the estimated variances of these linear combinations,
and then to use these variances in calculating the expected values of each estimated discount rate: E[ri] =
exp(r0Zi) exp(σ2ri/2) and E[βi] = exp(β
0Zi) exp(σ2βi/2). For any particular vector of explanatory variables,
24 In recourse, we can drop back to a specification with constant discount rates, to determine whether the task of estimating
a single common discount rate could be achieved for a generalized hyperbolic specification, in addition to a simple exponential
or simple hyperbolic model. While the single β parameter of the simple exponential, or the single γ parameter of the simple
hyperbolic model are readily estimated and strongly statistically significant in each model, neither is individually significant in
the generalized hyperbolic specification and there is a negligible change in the log-likelihood.
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an approximate 95 percent asymptotic confidence interval can be calculated by exponentiating the calculated
values of r0Zi ± 1.96
p
σ2ri.
The last line of Table 2 displays the marginal mean across the sample of the fitted point estimates for
each type of discount rate. Table 3 itemizes some key percentiles of the marginal distributions of the fitted
values of E[ri] and E[βi]. Keep in mind that all of the variability in these point estimates across the sample
is created by differences in the choice scenarios posed, differences in respondent attributes, or differences in
the mode of elicitation of the choice. Our fitted individual exponential discount rates range between about 2
percent and 22 percent, while the hyperbolic discount rates vary between about 0.15 and 1.00. Considerable
heterogeneity in fitted discount rates therefore exists, and to an extent that is likely to be economically
significant, as well as statistically significant.25
V. Conclusions
It has been well-documented that empirically estimated discount rates vary dramatically across samples
and across the choice contexts and techniques used to elicit them (Frederick et al., 2002).26 Now, within this
one study, we have varied a wide array of the factors that have elsewhere differed across studies, allowing
us to make systematic assessments of the effects on implied individual discount rates of the choice context,
individual characteristics, and (tangentially) the format of the elicitation method.
The distribution of discount rates in our multi-university and international student sample are not likely
to be representative of the distribution of discount rates in the general population because of self-selection
of individuals into the college population. Nevertheless, insights about how discount rates vary, within this
college population, are new. This information may be useful in helping policymakers concerned with tertiary
education to understand the different choices made by different types of students.
25Figures 1 and 2 in Appendix IV.C.depict the precision with which individual fitted discount rates are estimated. The 2062
fitted rates are first sorted according to size, then the 95% confidence bounds for each fitted value are displayed along with that
fitted value, all three as a function of the fitted rate. Points are connected to aid visualization.
26With at least forty empirical measures of discount rates, it is somewhat surprising that no researcher has yet attempted
a regression meta-analysis that can shed light on how the characteristics of a particular study contribute to higher or lower
estimated values of the discount rate.
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The empirical results presented in this paper also constitute a specific illustration of a method that holds
promise for helping us understand the determinants of heterogeneity in individual discount rates in a wide
variety of other choice contexts. We have demonstrated how to quantify individual-specific (latent) discount
rates for use as an additional heterogeneous individual characteristic that can help explain other choices.
Considerably more general-population empirical work will be needed before we are able to quantify individual-
specific discount rates with sufficient accuracy to warrant the calculation of the present discounted value of
a stream of future net benefits by first discounting individually or for distinct groups, then aggregating. (We
have argued that this is the conceptually correct approach, rather than first aggregating net benefits in each
future period, then discounting using a single representative discount factor.) We do, however, advocate a
shift in the direction of "discount first, aggregate second" as a research goal.
The direct elicitation of individual-specific discount rates will always be problematic because ordinary
citizens cannot be expected to know what a discount rate is, nor can they be expected to have introspected
very carefully about the magnitude of their own individual rate. As has been the case since some of the first
empirical efforts of Hausman (1979), researchers will typically be forced to infer implicit discount rates from
either real or stated choices. Only a sample like that of Weitzman (2001)–professional economists–could
reasonably be expected to articulate a discount rate directly with any degree of reliability.27
We find that private discount rates differ with age and/or life expectancy, gender, income, access to capi-
tal, and with exposure to economics training, among other things. Perhaps Weitzman’s "leading economists"
subsample displays slightly higher discount rates than the broader population of economists simply because
the individuals on Weitzman’s list are older and exclusively male. They are also likely to have higher family
incomes and greater access to capital. But we must also consider whether Weitzman’s sample of economists
should have the perogative of dictating the social discount rate to be used in policy-making, especially when
it seems that those who have taken a course in economics exhibit statistically significantly lower discount
27Weitzman was persistent in pressing his respondents to provide a point estimate of the relevant social discount rate for
climate change policy.
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rates. As in other studies of how economists are different, though, there remains the question of whether
economic training leads to lower discount rates, or whether individuals with innately lower discount rates
self-select to become economists.
Individual discount rate uncertainty, in addition to cross-sectional heterogeneity, remains an issue for
further investigation. We have made some progress in this direction by controlling for heteroscedasticity
in the error terms in the indirect utility functions used to infer individual discount rates. In our model,
however, this heteroscedasticity is not a factor in the calculation of expected individual discount rates. Our
expected discount rates are sensitive to the statistical precision with which the parameters of the discount
rate index are estimated, but not to the amount of systematic noise in the choice process for that type of
individual in that context.
What about the choice between exponential and hyperbolic discounting? It has proven impossible, in this
application, to differentiate conclusively between a conventional (constant) exponential discount model with
heterogeneity across individuals and a simple hyperbolic discount model with analogous heterogeneity. For
this particular data set, the exponential model is narrowly better in terms of its ability to explain individual’s
stated choices. However, the difference in the log-likelihood function is less than one (for 14,908 total choices),
and attempts to generalize the simple hyperbolic specification (with heterogeneity and heteroscedasticity) by
freeing up a single additional shape parameter completely fail to converge. This outcome suggests that the
standard exponential model and the alternative hyperbolic discounting model explain these observed choices
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APPENDIX I
Gamma vs. Generalized Hyperbolic Discounting
Using the same notation as in Loewenstein and Prelec (1992), but adapting it to Weitzman’s model, the
formula for the individual (continuous-time) discount factor is:
φi(t) = exp(−xit) (15)
Weitzman considers xi to be a random variable. For each individual, xi is a random draw from a gamma





xc−1 exp(−bx), b, c > 0 (16)
The mean of this gamma distribution is µ = c/b and the variance is σ2 = c/b2. In aggregating the diverse
individual opinions about appropriate discount rates spanned by his sample, Weitzman proposes an aggregate





Note that the expectation is the expected value of the continuous-time discounting function exp(−xt),
rather than the expectation of discount rates x themselves. Weitzman further notes that the marginal or
instantaneous effective discount rate at time t is defined to be
r(t) ≡ − φ̇(t)
φ(t)
(18)
















Alternatively, if the expectation is expressed in terms of the mean µ = c/b and the variance σ2 = c/b2
of the gamma distribution, it begins to resemble the Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) generalized hyperbolic









whereas, in terms of β and γ, it is:
φg(t) = (1 + γt)
−β/γ (21)
If we let β = µ = c/b and γ = σ2/µ = 1/b, it is clear that the two formulations are identical. Weitzman’s
formula for the expected present discounted value of a dollar at time t equals the generalized hyperbolic
discounting formula.
In the one-parameter hyperbolic discounting function of Harvey (1986), explored recently by Keller and
Strazzera (2002), the restriction γ = 1 is imposed to yield a simplified discounting function:
φa(t) = (1 + t)
−β (22)
The γ parameter in the Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) formulation of the discounting formula corresponds
to (1/b) in Weitzman’s parameterization of the gamma distribution. The gamma distribution collapses to
an exponential distribution when c = 1.
The conventional continuous-time discounting function, φ(t) = exp(−βt), is a limiting case of the gener-
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alized hyperbolic discounting function when γ → 0. This is easiest to see if one considers the instantaneous
effective discount rate at time t for the generalized hyperbolic discount function φ(t):






Recall that the parameter γ corresponds to the variance of the underlying gamma distribution, divided by its
mean. As γ approaches zero for any mean, β, of the distribution (note that β > 0 is required), this variance
must approach zero and the probability density function f(x) approaches a discrete mass with probability
one at the mean β, whereupon the expectation in equation (17) converges to φ(t) = exp(−βt), the familiar





We assume ε ∼logistic(0, κi) where the dispersion parameter κ may be distinct (proportional) across
contexts or for different types of respondents. Implicitly in all logit-based random utility models, the linear
“slope” coefficients (here, the µ and β vectors) can only be estimated up to a scale factor (i.e. relative to the
implicit dispersion parameter of the error term), so researchers often proceed in terms of a normalized scale
factor that is equal to one. If error variances differ across subsets of the data, then a factor of proportionality,
relative to the error dispersion for the numeraire subset, may be estimated for other subsets. To ensure
positive proportionality for the non-numeraire dispersion factors, they can be estimated as κi = exp(κ∗i )
The probability formulas that are relevant, for each different number of levels in the answer options
presented to respondents in each of our split samples, can now be defined for the ordered logit models used
in estimation. If each subsample were to be used independently, there would be m− 1 unknown threshold
parameters to be estimated for each format. (We label our thresholds as αjk, where j denotes the number
of answer categories and k denotes the threshold number, counting from the bottom, starting with zero.)
However, with the pooled data from all four variants, the boundary between “YES” and “NO” will be
normalized to zero, which means that α20 = 0 and α41 = 0 in the 2-level and 4-level cases, respectively. The
locations of the remaining thresholds are freely estimated (without symmetry restrictions) but it should be
the case that α30 < 0 and α31 > 0 for the 3-level cases, and α40 < 0 and α42 > 0 for the 4-level cases, and
α50 < 0, α51 < 0, and α52 > 0, α53 > 0 for the 5-level cases. In each of these cases, we will assess whether
outcomes with the expected sign are captured within the interval estimate for each threshold parameter.
Note that we cannot allow different thresholds according to the number of response categories, while
simultaneously allowing error variances to differ only by the number of response categories. This leaves either
the thresholds, or the error variances, underidentified. We do allow our error terms to differ systematically
with an array of other variables which are not strictly redundant with a set of dummy variables for the
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number of response categories.
The different options for the functional form of ∆Vi are itemized in the discussion of specifications in the
body of this paper. The probability formulas for each type of response format are as follows:
For the 2-level (Yes / No) format:
P2Yi =
1
1 + exp (α20/κi −∆Vi) (24)
P2Ni =
exp (α20/κi −∆Vi)
1 + exp (α20/κi −∆Vi)
For the 3-level (Yes / Not Sure / No) format:
P3Yi =
1













1 + exp(α30/κi −∆Vi)
For the 4-level (Definitely Yes / Probably Yes / Probably No / Definitely No) format:
P4DYi =
1























1 + exp(α40/κi −∆Vi)





































1 + exp(α50/κi −∆Vi)
Each threshold parameter αjk is normalized by the dispersion parameter, κi, for the error term in the relevant
subsample of data.
The last necessary ingredient for the development of the log-likelihood function for this model is a set of
indicators for choices. Indicators have the general format DnXi. The value of n indicates how many answer
levels were offered to the respondent (n = 2, 3, 4, 5), and X includes Y and N for Yes and No, with P for
the modifier "probably" and D for "definitely". NS is the abbreviation for the "not sure" category. All
indicators take a value of 1 if the designated response is selected, and are 0 otherwise.
All respondents provide either 3, 5, 7 or 13 responses to discounting questions. The different orderings and
different formats of the answer options were randomized across split samples, so the log-likelihood formulas
appropriate for each number of response options can simply be summed. The log-likehood to be maximized













[D4DYi ln(P4DYi) +D4PYi ln(P4PYi) (28)




[D5DYi ln(P5DYi) +D5PYi ln(P5PYi)




Discussion of additional parameters
III.A. Survey Design Effects (Elicitation Format)
In this Appendix, we discuss the parameter estimates in the continuation of Table 2. All of the ex-
perimental “treatments” described in this section were randomly assigned across respondents. It appears
to make no detectable difference to the implied discount rates whether the answer options are arranged
horizontally from “Yes” to “No,” or the reverse.
It does seem to matter whether the lump sums are presented in increasing or decreasing order. This
suggests "starting point effects." If the first lump sums in the individual’s list are smaller than later lump
sums, the implied discount rate will be smaller (although this effect is just marginally significant at the
5 percent level in the exponential model, and significant at just greater than the 5 percent level in the
hyperbolic specification). These are useful results to consider in the design of such instruments in the future.
There is little action in terms of the number of different lump sums that the respondent is asked to
consider. (It is worth noting that homoscedastic models, not reported, suggested that discount rates might
be sensitive to this factor. As always, one suspects a combination of “fatigue” and “learning” effects when
the number of choice tasks increases.)
The final factor is the number of answer options provided (from 2-level choices to 5-level choices). The
3-level and 5-level choice formats each involve a “Not Sure” option, and discount rates implied in these two
subsamples are statistically significantly lower, and by about the same amount, compared to the 2-level and
4-level formats where the respondent was forced to make a Yes/No distinction. Note that discount rates are
lower for everyone when the choice format has a "Not Sure" option, not just for those individuals who may
choose this option.
III. B. Heteroscedasticity
The ability of the individual to make a coherent informed decision about how they would prefer to take
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their lottery winnings may depend to a certain extent on their familiarity with state-sponsored lotteries.
Fortunately, we asked each respondent specifically if there was a state-sponsored lottery in their jurisdiction,
and whether they could legally play. We also asked how many lottery tickets they purchased per year. These
three variables are employed to shift the dispersion parameter, κi, (the inverse of the "scale factor" examined
in some stated preference research (see Swait and Louviere, 1993, or DeShazo and Fermo (2002)). These
lottery-related variables are intended to capture the respondent’s familiarity with the usual choice about how
to take one’s winnings. Even if the individual has never won a lottery, just playing the lottery or hearing
advertisements for their state lottery may invoke speculation about what they would do if they did win.
For our sample, the logarithm of the error dispersion in the random utility model is decreased statistically
significantly if the respondent is more familiar with state lotteries due to the presence of a lottery in their
jurisdiction. Intriguingly, the reduction in the error dispersion is twice as large if there is a lottery but the
respondent cannot play the lottery than if they can. This status, however, is a proxy for age, so these results
effectively show that exposure to a state lottery reduces error variances more for the youngest respondents.
This seems plausible. We also find that the more often the respondent reports actually playing the lottery,
the lower is the error dispersion.
The quality of choice information provided by a given respondent is also suspected to differ with the
amount of care and attention devoted to the particular choice task. We can observe, for example, whether
the individual managed to complete the entire online survey after having responded to the lottery winnings
choice question. Respondents who eventually attained the penultimate "Debriefing" page of the survey were
asked about the extent to which they had to rush to complete the survey. Possible answers were 0=no,
1=yes, a little, and 2=yes, a lot. Respondents who went on to complete the survey have systematically
smaller error dispersions for their choices. For the "how rushed?" variable, though, being more rushed leads
to a lower, rather than a higher error variance. One might initially think that a respondent who is rushing
through the survey might be more inclined to just check one column, but low variance in observed choices
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is not the same thing as low variance in the errors.28
We also track the entry and exit times for each page of the online survey, which allows us to construct
durations for each page. In a small fraction of cases, these durations are excessively long, suggesting that
the respondent was diverted to some other task while the page was still open. We examined the marginal
distribution of durations for the lottery winnings page and determined that durations up to approximately
the 90th percentile of this distribution appeared to be valid, whereas somewhere beyond the 90th percentile,
inconsistently large outlying values begin to be observed. We thus create a dummy variable to designate
"good" durations on the lottery winnings page.
If a respondent’s duration on the lottery winnings page seems reliable, the error dispersion is system-
atically smaller. For these reliable instances, we also allow the error dispersion to vary systematically with
time spent on the page. Since different respondents faced different numbers of lump sums, and were there-
fore being asked to consider more choices on this page, we also control for the number of lump sums each
person saw. The greater the amount of time the individual spent on the lottery winnings page, the lower
the error dispersion. The number of lump sums being considered does not have any individually statistically
significant effect on error dispersions.
One design element that appears to have a marginal effect on the magnitude of the discount rates elicited
was whether the lump sum bids were presented as increasing or decreasing from top to bottom on the page.
We include this variable also as a potential shifter of the dispersion term, but it has no statistically significant
effect.
Finally, individuals’ aptitudes for considering the lottery winnings tradeoffs may differ systematically
with their familiarity with the idea of discounting. We therefore include a dummy variable for whether the
individual has ever taken a course in economics. As expected, those who have taken such a course exhibit
smaller error dispersions, suggesting a greater facility at making intertemporal tradeoffs in a time-constrained





The ordered logit threshold parameters make up the remaining eight parameters estimated in each model.
The expected signs of these thresholds should be (- ,+, -, +, -, -, +, +). The only instances of incorrect
signs are associated with insignificant point estimates, suggesting that correctly signed thresholds lie within
the confidence intervals for each parameter.
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APPENDIX IV
Digressions Concerning the Data
IV.A. Age and Income Distributions
The entire distributions of ages (Table IV.1) and incomes (Table IV.2) in the estimating sample may of
interest to a critical reader.
IV.B. Constant and "Reversed" Responses
There was one discernible difficulty in our data. Rationality would imply that a respondent should
provide answers that progress monotonically, from "No" answers for their willingness to accept the smallest
lump-sum payments in lieu of the series of annual payments, through to "Yes" answers for the willingness
to accept the highest lump-sum payments. In the most extreme cases, answers should be constant (as they
were for about 29 percent of our sample (604 out of 2062). Individuals who react at all to the stimulus
of different implicit discount rates embodied in their list of lump sum amounts should vary their answers.
Non-monotonic progressions would appear to be irrational. 47 respondents who selected a non-monotonic
progression of answers were deleted from the analysis.
Retained in our analysis were individuals who checked the same response for all lump-sum payments.
Also retained were respondents who appear to have confused the direction of the comparison in the choice
question. About 12 percent of our sample (namely 257 out of 2062 respondents) appeared to have interpreted
our lottery winnings question backwards, as though it was asking whether they would prefer the series of
annual payments, rather than the lump sum. Since their answers seem to be substantive, despite this reversal,
we elect to keep them in the analysis after we have "corrected" the direction of their choices.29
In order to better understand the characteristics of individuals who gave constant or "reversed" responses
to the lottery winnings question (as opposed to "good" responses), we have estimated the multinomial logit
29Table IV.3 contains additional detail concerning the characteristics of different types of respondents, and how these affect
their fitted propensities to give constant choices or "reversed" choices.
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model in Table IV.3. (Estimation was accomplished using Stata.) The omitted category is "good" responses.
The coefficients show the sign (and significance) of each variable on the propensity for the respondent’s
answers to fall into each category. Only persistently significant (or nearly significant) parameters are retained.
Complete specifications employing all the same variables as the fitted individual discount rates (not reported
here) achieved maximized log-likelihood values of only -1179.1536 and -746.8533 respectively, so little is lost
by moving to these more limited specifications.
Constant responses suggest that the individual was not inclined to spend much time reflecting on the
choices being presented, unless their implicit discount rate is truly less than 1 percent or greater than the rate
embodied in the smallest lump sum they were offered. Among the individual characteristics, respondents
with higher family incomes are for some reason less likely to be unresponsive to the stimulus contained in
the differing lump sums, checking just one column among the answer options instead of varying their choices
in response to differences in the lump sum that is offered.. Likewise, younger respondents are less prone
to check a single column as are social science majors, and (possibly) those who do not work either full or
part time. This may reflect differences in the opportunity costs of time across different types of students.
Higher family income may permit students to spend more time on course-related optional activities such as
this survey, and less time on work, for example. It also seems clear that the more complex the elicitation
format provided to the respondent, the less likely is he or she to check a single column of answers, rather
than varying their selections.
Concerning reversed responses, some very different factors seem to predominate. Being female increases
the chance that the selections will appear to be reversed, but this propensity dimishes with age. It is also
lower if the respondent has taken a course in economics, or if they are employed part or full-time. Among
the different formats, the only cases with significantly larger chances of reversed responses are those who
were "treated" with the greatest number of lump sums.
IV. C. Fitted Individual Discount Rates and Confidence Bounds
41
Figure 1 (exponential discount rates) and Figure 2 (hyperbolic discount rates) depict the precision with



















Fitted Individual Exponential Discount Rates (n=2062)
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Fitted Individual Hyperbolic Discount Rates (n=2062)
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Descriptive Statistics (n = 2062)
Abbreviation Description Mean Std.Dev.
Nature of the choice scenario
annual amount annual lottery payment ($’000) 2.144 1.629
time horizon number of annual payments 29.91 8.341
Individual-specific characteristics
age age (years; midpoints of 5-yr brackets) 22.24 5.502
female = 1 if female, =0 if male 0.5024
educ. attain. 0 = h/s or less, 4 = graduate degree 1.114 0.7008
family income family income ($’000, bracket midpts) 67.00 38.89
capital access capital access ($’000) 17.60 32.89
major = business = 1 if major(ed) in business 0.3497
major = soc.sci. = 1 if major(ed) in social sciences 0.2978
econ course = 1 if economics course ever taken 0.8792
conservatism 0 = liberal,4 = conservative 1.742 1.095
work = 1 if work full- or part-time 0.4360
lottery (can play) =1 if lottery available and can play 0.8337
lottery (can’t play) =1 if lottery available but can’t play 0.05723
times played/yr times lottery played per year 3.442 7.626
finished survey? respondent finished entire survey 0.9326
how rushed? 0=no rush, 1= somewhat, 2=very 0.3385 0.5070
"good" duration "0-90th" percentile of durations on task 0.9011
duration on task duration (minutes) if "0-90th" percentile 1.048 0.6768
Characteristics of the elicitation format (randomized)
“yes” on left = 1 if “yes” on left 0.5145
increasing sums = 1 if lump sums increasing 0.4864
5 lump sums = 1 if five lump sums considered 0.2371
7 lump sums = 1 if seven lump sums considered 0.2570
13 lump sums = 1 if thirteen lump sums considered 0.2493
# of lump sums continuous number of lump sums 6.995 3.746
3-level answers = 1 if 3-level response options 0.2473
4-level answers = 1 if 4-level response options 0.2342
5-level answers = 1 if 5-level response options 0.2716
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Table 2
Parameter Estimates, Heteroscedastic Exponential and
Hyperbolic Discounting Models (n=2062)
Exponential Hyperbolic
ri = exp(r
0Zi) βi = exp(β
0Zi)
Variables Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Aux.
R2
constant -5.806 (-13.69)** -4.152 (-12.00)**
Contextual differences: nature of the choice scenario (randomized)
annual payment 0.05424 (3.40)** 0.04447 (3.32)**
time horizon -0.007361 (-3.52)** 0.01056 (5.88)**
Individual-specific characteristics (non-orthogonal)
log(age) 1.062 (8.05)** 0.8673 (8.10)** 0.62
female 2.063 (4.22)** 1.738 (4.41)** 0.99
female*log(age) -0.7019 (-4.43)** -0.5893 (-4.61)** 0.99
educ. attain -0.1022 (-3.80)** -0.08455 (-3.79)** 0.33
family income 0.002069 (4.89)** 0.001750 (4.97)** 0.09
capital access 0.002689 (5.09)** 0.002318 (5.47)** 0.14
major = business -0.07746 (-2.26)** -0.06122 (-2.13)** 0.12
major = soc.sci. 0.2016 (5.83)** 0.1672 (5.85)** 0.11
econ course -0.1261 (-2.42)** -0.1191 (-2.74)** 0.08
conservatism 0.02398 (1.66)* 0.01517 (1.27) 0.04
work 0.03315 (1.07) 0.02446 (0.94) 0.02
...See Appendix III for discussion of additional parameters...
Max Log L -15106.699 -15107.472
Mean rate 0.06056 0.2977
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Table 3
Distributions of Fitted Individual Discount Rates









Table 2, continued - Other parameters
Parameter Estimates, Heteroscedastic Exponential and
Hyperbolic Discounting Models (n=2062)
Exponential Hyperbolic
ri = exp(r
0Zi) βi = exp(β
0Zi)
Variables Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio Aux.
R2
Characteristics of the elicitation format (randomized):
yes” on left 0.02919 (0.97) 0.03020 (1.20) -
increasing sums -0.05917 (-1.96)** -0.04819 (-1.91)* -
5 lump sums -0.09691 (-1.62) -0.06801 (-1.37) -
7 lump sums 0.04096 (0.75) 0.04431 (0.98) -
13 lump sums 0.05712 (1.11) 0.06310 (1.49) -
3-level answers -0.3958 (-6.51)** -0.3113 (-6.19)** -
4-level answers -0.06886 (-1.39) -0.06014 (-1.49) -
5-level answers -0.3638 (-6.18)** -0.3038 (-6.28)** -
Heteroscedasticity (factors shifting utility-difference error std. dev.):
lottery (can play) -0.2933 (-5.80)** -0.2923 (-5.78)** 0.32
lottery (can’t play) -0.6125 (-8.30)** -0.6130 (-8.31)** 0.31
times play/yr -0.003321 (-1.81)* -0.003302 (-1.80)* 0.02
finished survey? -0.3723 (-6.29)** -0.3668 (-6.20)** 0.04
how rushed? -0.04835 (-1.74)* -0.04899 (-1.77)* 0.05
"good" duration -0.1357 (-2.23)** -0.1426 (-2.34)** 0.28
duration on task -0.1794 (-7.89)** -0.1761 (-7.74)** 0.30
# of lump sums 0.0003338 (0.09) 0.0004097 (0.12) -
increasing bids 0.04048 (1.43) 0.03630 (1.28) -
econ course -0.1688 (-3.86)** -0.1703 (-3.89)** 0.02
Incidental parameters (ordered logit thresholds)
α30 -0.1970 (-10.45)** -0.1897 (-10.18)**
α31 0.007781 (0.43) 0.01494 (0.84)
α40 -0.3644 (-24.81)** -0.3651 (-24.84)**
α42 0.3269 (25.35)** 0.3267 (25.33)**
α50 -0.4987 (-22.56)** -0.4981 (-22.84)**
α51 -0.2125 (-11.80)** -0.2116 (-11.97)**
α52 -0.02199 (-1.29) -0.02090 (-1.25)
α53 0.2502 (13.61)** 0.2515 (13.87)**
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Table IV.1
Age Distribution in the Sample
Approximate Age in Years Frequency Percent Cum.
("midpoints") (range)
18 20 or less 856 41.51 41.51
23 21-25 938 45.59 87.00
28 26-30 153 7.42 94.42
36 31-40 79 3.83 98.25
46 41-50 30 1.45 99.71
58 51-64 4 0.19 99.90
69 65 or more 2 0.10 100.00
Total 2062 100.00
Table IV.2
Income Distribution in the Sample
Annual Family Income Now Frequency Percent Cum.
("midpoints") (range)
8 <$10,000 101 4.90 4.90
15 $10,000-20,000 157 7.61 12.51
25 $20,000-30,000 206 9.99 22.50
40 $30,000-50,000 361 17.51 40.01
62.5 $50,000-75,000 405 19.64 59.65
87.5 $75,000-100,000 371 17.99 77.64




Multinomial Logit Model to Explain Status of Lottery Winnings
Responses: "Good" (numeraire) versus "Constant" and "Reversed"
Constant Responses "Reversed" Responses
Variables Estimate t-ratio Estimate t-ratio
constant -1.1959 (-1.53) -2.0608 (-5.95)**
Individual characteristics (non-orthogonal)




educ. attain -0.1555 (-1.37)
major = business 0.2204 (1.52)
major = soc.sci. -0.3800 (-3.35)**
econ course -0.5002 (-2.63)**
work 0.1718 (1.70)* -0.2614 (-1.88)*
Contextual differences: Nature of the choice scenario (randomized)
horizon -0.0100 (-1.66)* 0.0146 (1.78)*
Characteristics of the stated preference format (randomized)
yes” on left -0.2151 (-1.59)
increasing sums 0.1550 (1.55)
5 lump sums -0.9129 (-6.44)**
7 lump sums -0.7783 (-5.72)**
13 lump sums -0.7674 (-5.60)** 0.4887 (3.35)**
3-level answers -0.2717 (-2.01)**
4-level answers -0.6584 (-4.60)**
5-level answers -0.8270 (-5.87)**
Max Log L -1181.0578 -748.9764
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